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THE FUTURE OF  
FEDERAL LAW CLERK HIRING 
AARON L. NIELSON* 
The market for federal law clerks has been upended.  Beginning in 
2003, the Federal Judges Law Clerk Hiring Plan was implemented to 
regulate clerkship hiring.  According to the Plan, a judge could not 
interview or hire a potential law clerk before the beginning of the 
applicant’s third year of law school.  The Plan, however, never worked 
well, constantly got worse, and has now officially collapsed.  Across the 
country, clerkship hiring once again regularly occurs during the second 
year of law school. 
This Article addresses the rise and inevitable fall of the Plan.  In 
particular, it submits that the Plan never had a realistic chance of success 
because coordinated action in a competitive market is difficult to 
maintain, especially without an effective enforcement mechanism to 
punish noncompliance.  Here, the Plan collapsed because its enforcement 
mechanism was far too weak.  And the reason why the Plan did not have 
a more effective enforcement mechanism was no accident: any mechanism 
that could work would require judges to give up too much. 
Against that backdrop, this Article explains what clerkship hiring will 
likely look like in the future.  Importantly, given the steep costs of an 
effective enforcement mechanism, this Article contends that it is unlikely 
that a new hiring plan will be adopted.  This is especially true because 
modern trends are already beginning to mitigate the concerns associated 
with an unregulated clerkship market. 
  
 
*  Associate Professor, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University (on 
leave).  Versions of this Article were presented at the Utah Appellate Court Conference and 
the J. Reuben Clark Law School Work-in-Progress Series.  The author thanks the many 
people who have provided insights, with particular thanks to RonNell Andersen Jones, David 
Moore, and Lisa Grow Sun.  Travis Hunt and Stacie Stewart provided excellent research 
assistance.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The perennial issue of what a law clerk’s role ought to be is not 
going away anytime soon.  The more interesting question, however, may 
not be what clerks do, but rather how they are hired.  In particular, the 
market for federal judicial law clerks has been upended.  In 2003, the 
Federal Judges Law Clerk Hiring Plan (the Plan) was instituted to 
regulate clerkship hiring.1  The Plan’s purpose was to push interviewing 
back until the fall of a student’s 3L year.2  This was no small goal.  
Groups of judges for decades have bemoaned the unregulated clerkship 
market and strove for something better.3  The Plan—designed to 
address “market failures”—represented the long-awaited fruit of that 
striving.4   
The Plan, however, has fallen apart.  Last year, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit withdrew from the Plan and began openly 
interviewing 2L students.5  After that, everything unraveled quickly, 
with judges across the country following the D.C. Circuit’s lead—that is, 
if they were not already hiring 2Ls, as many were.  Then, on November 
4, 2013, the Plan formally collapsed.  That day, the federal judiciary’s 
website announced that 2Ls could submit applications through the 
Online System for Clerkship Application and Review (OSCAR).6  In 
short, the unregulated market is back. 
For many, this regulatory failure is frustrating.  But it was no 
surprise.  Every hiring season it became increasingly obvious that the 
problems of the unregulated market were reemerging in the “regulated” 
market, but with a particularly cruel twist.  Not only did the unregulated 
 
1.  Aaron L. Nielson, Reflections on the End of the Federal Law Clerk Hiring Plan, 112 
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 22, 23 (2013), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi
/112/Nielson.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9Q5E-PF3C; see also Christopher Avery, 
Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The New Market for Federal Judicial 
Law Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 449–50 (2007).  
2.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 23. 
3.  Id. 
4.  E.g., Avery et al., supra note 1, at 454 & n.33. 
5.  See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 1, at 22; see also Notice Regarding Law Clerk Hiring by 
D.C. Circuit Judges for the 2014–2015 and Subsequent Terms, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Human+
Resources+-Law+Clerk+Hiring (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) [hereinafter Notice Regarding Law 
Clerk Hiring], archived at http://perma.cc/B96J-2JVJ. 
6.  See OSCAR De-links from the Hiring Plan, OSCAR (Nov. 4, 2013, 8:55 AM), 
https://oscar.uscourts.gov/blog_post/_1/21/OSCAR_De-links_from_the_Hiring_Plan, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8SRD-LADH. 
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market reassert itself, it did so under cover of darkness, creating real 
unfairness.  To get a clerkship, students were well-served by applying 
early, notwithstanding the Plan’s rules to the contrary.  Naive applicants 
were often out of luck.  No one thought that was a good thing.  The Plan, 
accordingly, was abandoned.  After all, if there can’t be order, there can 
at least be transparency. 
Now that the Plan is gone, what does the future hold?  To answer 
that question, it is essential to understand why the Plan collapsed.  This 
Article addresses the Plan’s fatal flaw: maintaining collective action is 
difficult.  This key insight of antitrust economics is especially true where 
large numbers of heterogeneous participants compete against each other 
in an opaque marketplace—in other words, in a market like the federal 
judiciary.  In such markets, a powerful enforcement mechanism is 
necessary to preserve collective action, but powerful enforcement 
mechanisms are not cheap.  The Plan failed because its enforcement 
mechanisms—primarily OSCAR’s automated application process, 
augmented by buy-in from law schools and the anchoring role of the 
D.C. Circuit—were not sturdy enough to withstand the competitive 
pressures put on them.  And it was no accident that a more powerful 
enforcement mechanism was not in place.  More powerful mechanisms 
have been proposed, but they have not been adopted because, from the 
perspective of judges, they cost too much relative to their benefits. 
After explaining this structural reality of the clerkship marketplace, 
this Article sets forth the current state of clerkship hiring and considers 
the future.  Given just how much it would take to create and maintain 
an effective enforcement mechanism, the prospects of a new plan—and 
certainly a successful new plan—are grim.  In particular, to justify the 
steep cost of an enforcement mechanism that could actually work, the 
benefits of a new plan would have to go much deeper than simply 
bringing order to the market.  Those benefits have already been 
weighed and found wanting.7 
But there might be other benefits of regulation that have not yet 
been considered.  For example, some data—albeit inconclusive—
suggests that women law students on average do less well during the first 
year of law school but that the divergence dissipates as school 
continues.8  If so, then making clerk hiring more dependent on 1L 
 
7.  See, e.g., George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other 
Assortative Matching Markets, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 123 (2005). 
8.  See infra note 185.  
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grades will have an asymmetric impact on the gender of clerks—an 
obvious problem.  Similarly, the unregulated market may 
disproportionately benefit more prestigious law schools; the earlier 
hiring occurs, the less data a judge has about an individual applicant, 
making the “brand” value of the applicant’s school a weightier signal of 
quality.  This too may have systemic effects: for instance, if graduates of 
higher-ranked law schools produce different substantive outcomes as 
clerks than graduates of lower-ranked schools, which seems implausible, 
or, perhaps more likely, if it means that clerks are less likely to continue 
their careers in the communities where they clerk.   
Nevertheless, even if these potential unexplored benefits are real, it 
still would not necessarily follow that a new plan should be created.  
There may be alternatives to regulation that achieve the same benefits 
at a lower cost.  For instance, the modern trend of hiring more graduates 
as clerks—as opposed to current students—may solve or at least 
mitigate the problem of hiring clerks too early.  At the same time, 
modern technology may make the market more transparent, thus 
discouraging distasteful hiring behavior. 
*** 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II sets forth why the Plan was 
created, what problems it was supposed to solve, and the chronology of 
the Plan’s collapse.  Part III then addresses the key reason why the Plan 
failed: an enforcement mechanism powerful enough to prevent 
unraveling in a market like the federal judiciary would be prohibitively 
costly in light of the potential benefits.  Part IV, in turn, describes the 
current state of the clerkship market.  Lastly, Part V considers the future 
of law clerk hiring.   
II. THE CREATION AND COLLAPSE OF THE PLAN  
 The character of the clerkship market is oft discussed—perhaps too 
oft.9  Nevertheless, the facts bear repeating at least once more.  One 
cannot predict the future of clerkship hiring without appreciating the 
dynamic driving the action.  In any event, we often need not be taught as 
 
9.  See, e.g., Paul H. Edelman, Law Clerks, Law Reviews & Some Modest Proposals, 7 
GREEN BAG 2D 335, 335 (2004) (criticizing, with tongue-partially-in-cheek, the volume of 
literature on the clerkship market as reflecting “the self-absorption of legal academics”).  
There is truth to this charge.  Nevertheless, clerkship hiring can illustrate more transcendent 
lessons about regulatory design.  See Nielson, supra note 1, at 22.  If it takes a market that 
academics and judges are already familiar with to teach those lessons, so be it.   
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much as reminded. 
Clerkships are valuable.  This means that clerkship hiring is 
competitive for applicants who want to be hired by the best, most 
prestigious judges; for judges, who want to hire the best, most able 
clerks; and for law schools that compete against each other in the 
rankings.  Because there are not enough clerkships for every student 
who wants one, and because there are not enough perceived top 
students for every judge,10 competition inevitably results.   
Competition, however, is messy.11  It promises prestige for 
innovators, portends punishment for those who fall behind, and makes 
the “quiet life” hard to obtain.12  For this reason, competition is not 
always appreciated—sometimes by those who benefit from an anti-
competitive status quo,13 but also by those who feel that at least some 
activities are ill-served by the constant elbow-jostling that competition 
demands.  Maurice E. Stucke, for instance, asks whether “[p]arents” 
 
10.  To be sure, some believe the pool of quality applicants is so deep that this entire 
issue is silly.  See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, More on the Law Clerk Hiring Process—An 
Interview with Federal Judge Robert Lasnik, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/06/more-on-the-law-clerk-hiring-process-
an-interview-with-federal-judge-robert-lasnik.html#more-87353, archived at http://perma.cc/5
QM7-SNBY (“It is nonsense to think that there is such a limited pool of superstar students 
that we all have to compete for or judges will be saddled with inferior clerks.  As I said, I hire 
merely months before the clerkship begins and I have had some fabulous clerks who have 
become tremendous lawyers.”).  It is undoubtedly true that capable clerks can always be 
found.  Nevertheless, many judges compete vigorously because they believe they can find 
better clerks by doing so.  See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 YALE L.J. 
1707, 1708 (1991).  Perhaps both sides are right; different judges want different things from 
their clerks.  See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152, 153 
(1990). 
11.  Cf. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 
(Harper & Row 1976) (1942) (discussing the idea of “creative destruction”); ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 80–88 (1978) 
(explaining how competition can topple previously stable markets). 
12.  See R.H. Coase, Some Notes on Monopoly Price, 5 REV. ECON. STUD. 17, 30 (1937) 
(“‘The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life!’ . . .  The quiet life which a monopoly allows 
will therefore probably result in a slowing down of the rate of progress.” (quoting J.R. Hicks, 
Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 
(1935))); Priest, supra note 7, at 176 (same quote); see also Joseph M. Alioto, Antitrust on the 
Rebound, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 809, 809 (1999) (“Monopolists hate competition.  They 
suppress it.  They lobby against it.  They know that competition in the marketplace creates 
too much uncertainty—they never know what the other guy is going to do. . . .  They are 
terrified that some newcomer may unseat them.”). 
13.  Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any 
part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). 
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should really “foster competition among their children for their 
affection,” or “[p]arishioners” compete “for better pews and parking 
spaces.”14  At the same time, of course, this distaste for competition can 
be exploited, perhaps subconsciously, by those who want to use it for the 
less-than-noble purpose of hamstringing competitors.15   
The battle over how clerkship hiring ought to occur mirrors this 
broader conversation about the value and drawbacks of competition 
generally.  This is unsurprising: competition—with its attendant 
disorder—is everywhere when it comes to the clerkship market.  At 
every step in the process, competition abounds.  Some judges accept this 
competition as inevitable or at least the best option reasonably 
available;16 others go further and even seem to enjoy the disorder that 
competition causes;17 still others, however, bemoan the commotion and 
want competition to be restrained.18  Thus, the question is whether 
something ought—and can—be done to generate greater order?   
This section of the Article sets out the background of the discussion: 
 
14.  Maurice E. Stucke, Is Competition Always Good?, 1 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
162, 168 (2013); see also MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL 
LIMITS OF MARKETS 8–9 (2012) (raising a similar point that some activities are ill-served by 
markets).  But see Gary Becker, What Limits to Using Money Prices to Buy and Sell?, 
BECKER–POSNER BLOG (Oct. 21, 2012, 7:26 PM), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/2012/10/what-limits-to-using-money-prices-to-buy-and-sell-becker.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EM5H-PLQV (“I have not attempted to draw a sharp line between where 
prices and markets should be used and where they should not be.  Nor do I deny that for 
some activities the cost of using money prices would exceed the gains.  I do believe, however, 
that in the US and other economies, the bigger problem is not excessive use of prices and 
markets but insufficient use.”). 
15.  Cf. Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists—The Education of a Regulatory 
Economist, REGULATION, May–June 1983, at 12, 13 (explaining how those who disliked 
alcohol were supported by bootleggers who just wanted less competition); Kozinski, supra 
note 10, at 1719 (explaining how a “neutral” limit on competition can benefit some judges at 
the expense of others). 
16.  See, e.g., Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, HOW APPEALING (Feb. 28, 2003, 8:27 AM), 
http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2003_02_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L6ET-RU6Z (“The current hiring plan . . . will fail, sooner or later, because a 
‘one size fits all’ scheme isn’t suited to the diverse body of federal judges in the various 
circuits.”). 
17.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, 1707–08 (“The Shangri-la that many of my 
colleagues envision—the ‘orderly process that comports with the seriousness of the job and 
the dignity of the relationship between judge and clerk’—is neither attainable nor desirable.” 
(quoting Wald, supra note 10, at 152)). 
18.  See, e.g., Wald, supra note 10, at 163 (“Maybe judges have to look harder . . . to see 
if the gamesmanship at which a few excel is really worth the angst and perceptions of 
unseemly competition that now cloud the clerkship selection process.”). 
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why clerkships are valuable, what hiring looks like in an unregulated 
market, why the outcomes of an unregulated market have been 
attacked, how the Hiring Plan worked, and the steps of its collapse.   
A. The Value of Clerkships 
To understand the rise and fall of the Federal Judges Law Clerk 
Hiring Plan, it is first necessary to appreciate why the clerkship market 
is so competitive.  The reason is straightforward: clerkships matter.  For 
students, clerkships are coveted because they are both valuable (clerks 
learn a lot of law from a seasoned mentor and gain better career 
options)19 and rare (hundreds of students apply for a judge’s handful of 
slots).20  And for judges, clerkships are critical because clerks do 
important work that judges do not have the capacity to do by themselves 
(a good clerk can help carry a portion of the judge’s load)21 and because 
many judges enjoy the mentoring relationship.22  Schools also care 
because their reputation is often tied, at least in part, to their ability to 
place clerks,23 particularly in prestigious clerkships.24  Schools know that 
 
19.  See, e.g., Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: 
Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149, 1155 (2010) 
(“Judges play multiple professional roles in the lives of their clerks: as exemplars of judicial 
ethics, craftsmanship, and decision-making; as mentors and career advisers; and as role 
models and sources of inspiration long after judges have retired or died.”); Penelope Pether, 
Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 51–52 (2007) (explaining career opportunities clerkships enable). 
20.  See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, The Law Clerk Hiring Process—An Interview with 
Federal Judge Thomas Ambro, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.concurri
ngopinions.com/archives/2014/03/the-law-clerk-hiring-process-an-interview-with-federal-judg
e-thomas-ambro.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QY9K-AE4S (“When the hiring plan was 
in effect and used widely, I received over 800 applications per term.”). 
21.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1708. 
22.  See, e.g., id. (“The relationship between judge and clerk is professional only in part; 
it is also a close human relationship, one that endures long after the clerkship ends.  By 
accepting a judge’s clerkship offer, a young lawyer becomes part of the judge’s extended 
family, a disciple, an ally, quite possibly a friend.”). 
23.  See, e.g., Robert Morse, Which Law Schools’ Grads Get the Most Judicial 
Clerkships?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (April 11, 2013, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/college-rankings-blog/2013/04/11/which-law-schools-
grads-get-the-most-judicial-clerkships, archived at http://perma.cc/WST7-2WVM.  
24.  See, e.g., The ATL Top 50 Law School Rankings 2014, ABOVE THE LAW, 
http://abovethelaw.com/careers/2014-law-school-rankings/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2014), archived 
at http://perma.cc/66LA-HJ6D (“We also acknowledge ‘prestige’ plays an outsized role in the 
legal profession.  Our methodology rewards schools for producing Supreme Court clerks and 
federal clerks because the market rewards people who get those jobs with money and 
prestige.  Don’t hate us, we’re just the messengers.”). 
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potential students and alumni are interested in how a school is doing in 
the clerkship race.  In this era of law-of-the-jungle competition between 
law schools, those voices carry a lot of weight. 
Students thus compete vigorously for clerkships.  They apply broadly 
and hope that a judge will call.  And not just any judge—students yearn 
for a “prestigious” judge.  Students know that judges are not 
“fungible”;25 judges have different personalities, sit in different places, 
and offer different post-clerkship employment prospects.26  Those 
students looking to clerk, accordingly, do all they can to stand out.  
Merely being good is not good enough.  With competition this cutthroat, 
the goal is to dazzle. 
At the same time, many judges are also competing.  Just as judges 
are not fungible, neither are clerkship applicants.  Judges want 
dazzlers—clerks who are smart, write well, get along with others, and 
will reflect well on the judge going forward.27  Judges (and current 
clerks) thus scour the hundreds of clerkship applications in the inbox.  
They also make phone calls to recommenders and do what they can to 
be around potential clerks to get a better sense of the applicant pool.  
For instance, some “upstart” judges—and even sometimes well-
established heavyweights—make appearances at law schools and call on 
networks of former clerks to, at least in part, find good clerks and build 
and reinforce the judge’s “brand.”28  A good reputation, after all, is 
always a good thing—including in clerkship hiring.  All the while, judges 
know that many other judges are doing the exact same thing.   
Law schools are also part of the rough-and-tumble.  They trumpet, 
for example, when one of their students receives a Supreme Court 
clerkship.29  This should not be a surprise.  Law schools care about the 
clerkship prospects of students, both because faculty care about students 
and because law schools know that clerkship placement matters to the 
 
25.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 22. 
26.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1709. 
27.  See, e.g., id. at 1708 (“There are substantial differences among clerks.  The 
difference between having clerks that are merely good and ones that are awesome can be the 
difference between a bad year and a wonderful one. . . .  I have been fortunate in having many 
clerks who were superstars, but have had some who were not.  I prefer the former, as do my 
colleagues, and that’s much of what the competition is about.”). 
28.  Cf. id. at 1719 (explaining the challenge for new judges to compete for clerks).  
29.  See, e.g., David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch: Is October Term 2014 Filled 
Up?  Plus a List of Top Feeder Judges, ABOVE THE LAW (May 5, 2014, 5:34 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/05/supreme-court-clerk-hiring-watch-is-october-term-2014-
filled-up-plus-a-list-of-top-feeder-judges/, archived at http://perma.cc/A2C3-ZV7C. 
 190 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:181 
school going forward.  Law schools thus create “clerkship committees” 
which both help prepare students to compete for clerkships and actively 
“shop” potential clerks to judges.  The institutional interests of law 
schools are particularly interesting, moreover, because of the time 
horizon.  An individual clerkship applicant only cares about placing one 
clerk: him or herself.  Not so with law schools; schools care not only 
about one applicant or even one year of applicants.  Instead, they are 
focused on building and maintaining long-term connections with judges, 
and that requires maintaining credibility.  This means that sometimes 
schools do not push a student as much as that student would like.  
Similarly, even within a law school faculty, there may be shades of 
competition.  As Judge Kozinski has argued, it is not a bad thing to be a 
“feeder professor” in terms of hiring talented research assistants.30   
In short, it’s competition all the way down.  Students compete, 
judges compete, and law schools compete.  Because clerkships are 
valuable and scarce, competition is inevitable.  And that means a 
market.   
B. What Clerkship Hiring Looks Like in an Unregulated Market 
This dynamic—competition among applying students to attract 
judges and competition among judges to attract students, with law 
schools always hovering about—creates a chaotic marketplace.  At 
bottom, this chaos is the motivating force behind the various attempts to 
regulate clerkship hiring.  Because clerkships are valuable, applicants try 
to get a leg up on other applicants, while judges try to outmaneuver each 
other.  Predictably, disorder results.   
In particular, unregulated clerkship competition leads to at least two 
main outcomes: (1) “early” hiring during the 2L year can produce less-
than-ideal matches as applicants who would prefer certain judges and 
judges who would prefer certain applicants do not find each other, and 
(2) both applicants and judges engage in behavior branded as unsavory.  
Each of these outcomes is used to justify regulation. 
1. Hiring in the Second Year of Law School 
The most obvious characteristic of an unregulated clerkship market 
is that many judges hire clerks in the 2L year.31  As well explained in the 
 
30.  See Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1729. 
31.  See Nielson, supra note 1, at 23. 
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leading article on the subject, the Harvard-Chicago Study, the reason 
why this occurs is straightforward:  
Any time that is set will tend to “unravel” because judges have 
an incentive to “jump the gun,” hiring slightly earlier than their 
competitors, to get the pick of the candidates.  Students have 
strong reasons to accept early offers from judges, among other 
things because they will not know what their other options may 
be, and also because it is, quite simply, difficult and 
uncomfortable to hold off a federal judge.32  
Specifically, this process occurs because judges want the best clerks 
and applicants often take the first offer they receive.33  This means that 
an applicant may (and often does) accept an offer from a less-preferred 
judge if that offer comes first.34  Although controversial,35 a “Just Say 
Yes” attitude can be rational.  In the clerkship market, the field is 
heavily tilted in favor of the bench because there are many applicants 
and few judges.  Even very good applicants, therefore, have reason to 
wonder whether they are really at the top of the list for their favorite 
judges.  So if another judge—not the favorite, but still good—comes 
along and makes an offer, a student is tempted to accept it.36  Law 
school is a stressful place; it is a happy day when a student knows what 
 
32.  Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market 
for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 793, 795 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
33.  Id. 
34.  See id. 
35.  Compare Karen Sloan, Clerkship Scramble: The System for Placing Them with 
Federal Judges is Breaking Down, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.nationallawjournal.c
om/id=1202473438279/Clerkshipscramble#ixzz35D4VxY7, archived at http://perma.cc/3PYA-
SGSB (observing that “exploding offers” may be detrimental to students and judges), with 
Avery et al., supra note 32, at 795 (explaining a judge’s motivations to make early offers with 
short acceptance timeframes). 
36.  Early hiring also need not be all bad from a pedagogical perspective.  Students may 
be more willing to take difficult courses in law school if they know that their class rank is less 
important.  In a competitive world, students, as a rule, are strategic in picking classes, 
especially students near the top of the class.  See, e.g., David M. Moss, The Hidden 
Curriculum of Legal Education: Toward a Holistic Model for Reform, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 
19, 21–22 (2013).  (Whether students ought to behave this way is a separate question.)  After 
a clerkship is in the bag, however, the benefits of such strategic class picking are diminished—
the student already has the door-opening credential.  He or she can thus breathe a bit easier 
and feel more comfortable taking classes where success is not as certain.  To be sure, some 
students with a clerkship in hand may “check out” of law school, at least somewhat.  But see 
Avery et al., supra note 32, at 803.  Pedagogically, this is less than ideal.  Even for such 
students, there is at least something to be said, from the student’s perspective, for peace of 
mind.   
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she will be doing after graduation.  Even if the clerkship offer comes 
from a less-than-favorite judge, the certainty that comes from accepting 
a clerkship is valuable.37  Recognizing this state of play, judges, looking 
to hire whom they prefer, often try to hire a bit earlier than other 
judges.38  This naturally leads to a competitive response.  Judges who 
lose out on clerks due to such strategic behavior have an incentive to 
also begin hiring earlier, leapfrogging the initial group of early-movers.39  
This prompts earlier hiring still in response, and so on.  The end result is 
that hiring moves up.   
There appears to be a natural limit to this process, however.  Hiring 
usually does not occur until after the first year of law school, and 
perhaps not until after the first semester of the second year of law 
school.40  The reason for this is equally obvious: “[T]he risk of a ‘dud’ 
[is] simply too high.”41  It takes a certain amount of information for a 
judge to confidently predict whether an applicant will be a good clerk.  
This means that the earlier a judge hires, the riskier the hire is—
especially because undergraduate grades by themselves are not a great 
predictor of legal aptitude,42 nor is a high LSAT score as powerful a 
predictor as actual law school grades.43  Hence, notwithstanding the 
alarm some may have that an unregulated clerkship market will push 
clerkship applications and selections to the second half of the 1L year, 
the market equilibrium appears to be sometime in the 2L year,44 
particularly for court of appeals judges.45 
 
37.  See, e.g., Priest, supra note 7, at 162. 
38.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 795–96. 
39.  See id. 
40.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1710. 
41.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 26. 
42.  See, e.g., Keith A. Kaufman, V. Holland LaSalle-Ricci, Carol R. Glass & Diane B. 
Arnkoff, Passing the Bar Exam: Psychological, Educational, and Demographic Predictors of 
Success, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 205, 214 (2007) (explaining that bar passage rates are not 
especially well-predicted by undergraduate grades). 
43.  See, e.g., id. at 217–18 (“Analyses of the educational variables indicate that those 
who passed the bar exam on their initial attempt had significantly better LGPAs, class ranks, 
and LSAT scores than did those who failed, with regression analyses showing LGPA to be a 
stronger predictor of bar exam performance than LSAT. . . .  [A study shows] that LGPA 
explains around 50 percent of the variance in bar exam scores compared to 15 percent for the 
LSAT.” (emphasis added) (citing Stephen P. Klein & Roger Bolus, The Size and Source of 
Differences in Bar Exam Passing Rates Among Racial and Ethnic Groups, BAR EXAMINER, 
Nov. 1997, at 8, 13)). 
44.  This assessment is based on a great deal of anecdotal information.  I am fairly 
confident that Judge Kozinski is right that a natural time for hiring is during the 2L year, 
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2. Disorderly Behavior 
The clerkship market is also characterized by competitive 
behavior—and that means disorder.  The stories are legion.  On the 
applicant side, for instance, some students refuse to answer their 
phones.46  It is hard to schedule interviews in a calculated way if a less 
favorite judge is on the other end of the line.  So applicants let calls go 
to voicemail.  Similarly, applicants, not unlike academics trying to place 
law review articles, may also try to trade up clerkship offers.47  At the 
end of the day, however, the tools available to applicants are limited; 
because there are lots of applicants and few judges, there is only so 
much leverage a student can have.  As explained above, there is a 
reason that applicants almost always accept an offer when made.48   
More interestingly, judges have tricks of their own.49  Judges, for 
instance, sometimes make so-called “exploding” offers; if the applicant 
wants the job, she has to accept on the spot or the offer is gone forever.50  
 
though it may be closer to the beginning of the year than the end of it.  See Kozinski supra 
note 10, at 1710–11.  For some judges, it may be earlier still.   
45.  District court judges may have a different, later hiring schedule.  See infra note 142.   
46.  See, e.g., Alison Monahan, Judicial Clerkships: What You Need to Know About 
Scheduling Clerkship Interviews, THE GIRL’S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOL (Aug. 19, 2011), 
http://thegirlsguidetolawschool.com/08/what-you-need-to-know-about-scheduling-judicial-cler
kship-interviews/, archived at http://perma.cc/7EK4-CVNE (“The most critical piece of advice 
for managing your interview schedule is simple: do not answer the phone!” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
47.  Cf. Edelman, supra note 9, at 336. 
48.  Professor Edelman wonders why clerkship applicants almost always say yes to 
clerkship offers.  See id. at 341–42 (speculating that “the ‘Just Say “Yes”’ norm . . . is founded 
in some exotic judge-worship cult or on some inchoate sense that if a judge were to be turned 
down the disrespect thus displayed would be communicated to the rest of the judiciary”); see 
also Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1726 (same point).  As discussed above, the answer may be 
more straightforward: students know the ratio of judges to applicants is not in their favor.  
Moreover, the fact that it is hard to get a clerkship further encourages acceptance because 
many applicants have been assisted by faculty members or others who have called in favors to 
help the student with particular judges (indeed, some sorting happens before applications are 
even submitted as students self-select away or toward certain judges).  It can be hard to say 
no after that.  The underlying driver, however, is scarcity; the reason why contacting a judge 
even counts as calling in a favor is because judges have leverage.  For the very best applicants, 
it may make sense to be more selective.  But for everyone else, it is often reasonable that an 
applicant takes what comes and thanks his or her lucky stars.   
49.  I should note I have not personally witnessed any of this behavior.  None of the 
judges I clerked for acted this way.  See, e.g., Bashman, supra note 16. 
50.  See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Judges Compete for Law Clerks on Lawless Terrain, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2011, at B1 (noting that judges sometimes make exploding offers that 
candidates must “accept or decline . . . on the spot (and it’s a ‘Godfather’-style offer: one they 
can’t really refuse)”); Edward S. Adams, A Market-Based Solution to the Judicial Clerkship 
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Judges may also make vanishing offers; an offer is extended, the 
applicant is given time to think about it, but before the applicant can 
respond, the position is offered to someone else.51  Judges, too, may 
schedule interviews with applicants knowing that the odds are good (but 
not certain) that the position will be gone before the clerkship applicant 
even has a chance to interview.52  Given that applicants are traveling on 
their own dime, this practice is particularly nasty.  Finally, judges might 
speak ill of other judges to try to dissuade applicants from accepting 
competing offers.53  Sharing information, of course, is not a bad thing—
that is, unless the information is false or distorted.54   
Making matters more chaotic, no one knows for sure what exactly 
the hiring process will be like in any particular year.  The market 
evolves.55  Judges respond to each other’s hiring decisions, meaning the 
market can change in unpredictable ways.56  Given the competing 
pressures, it is unsurprising that the market has been derided as 
“madcap,” “surreal,” and “ludicrous”—a world “in which the law of the 
jungle reigns and badmouthing, spying and even poaching among judges 
is rife.”57  Many of those adjectives are overstatements, but the overall 
gist is true enough.  It is messy.   
C. Unsuccessful Efforts to Regulate Clerkship Hiring 
Many judges find this chaos distasteful—they believe that an 
unregulated clerkship market is both inefficient and injudicious.58  These 
judges condemn the unregulated market as inefficient because clerks are 
hired too early.  Hiring a student in the 2L year means that decisions are 
based on incomplete data, sometimes only a single year of law school 
grades.59  Relatedly, “mismatches” occur; applicants sometimes would 
 
Selection Process, 59 MD. L. REV. 129, 133 (2000) (same point). 
51.  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 50, at 133. 
52.  See, e.g., Priest supra note 7, at 201 (listing identified bad behavior). 
53.  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 50, at 133. 
54.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1717 (“Then there is the matter of one judge (or 
his staff) showering an applicant with adverse information about another judge: ‘He’s a tyrant 
to work for’; ‘She’s never in the office’; ‘He’s dumb as dirt.’  And this is only the mildest 
stuff.”). 
55.  See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 32, at 805. 
56.  Id. at 795–96. 
57.  Adams, supra note 50, at 131 (quoting Wald, supra note 10, at 152) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
58.  See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 1, at 449. 
59.  See Avery et al., supra note 32, at 801–02.  To be sure, it likely is true that more 
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prefer certain judges but end up with other judges even though the 
preferred judges would also prefer those applicants.60  As for being 
injudicious, such judges bemoan exploding and vanishing offers, 
especially coupled with the peculiarity of seasoned judges jockeying 
among themselves to impress law students.61  After all, shouldn’t judges 
be above such pettiness?62 
This distaste for the unregulated clerkship market has led to 
numerous unsuccessful efforts to impose a sturdy hiring plan: 
Beginning in the 1970s, . . . attempt[s] [were undertaken] to 
regulate the clerkship market. . . .  [All] failed.  Judges either 
ignored the [effort] or backslid from it.  Regulation did not work 
in 1978 when the American Association of Law Schools created 
guidelines; in 1983 when the Federal Judicial Conference 
requested that judges move their hiring dates back; in 1989 when 
then-Judge Stephen Breyer and Judge Edward Becker tried to 
gather support for greater uniformity in hiring; in 1990 when a 
prominent group of judges attempted coordination; and in 1994 
when Breyer, Becker, and now-Judge Guido Calabresi tried 
again.63  
The common denominator of these regulatory efforts was the belief 
that the federal judiciary could do better.64   
D. The Hiring Plan 
Notwithstanding this dismal track record, the federal judiciary tried 
market regulation again in 2003 with the Plan.65  This time things were 
supposed to be different.  The Plan, after all, was “[b]acked by an 
 
information (and hence waiting for more grades) will help some judges identify better clerks 
in some cases.  But there are trade-offs.  See Nielson, supra note 1, at 26 (“Indeed, even 
proponents of the Plan do not take their efficiency argument to its logical conclusion—that 
hiring should occur after graduation.”).  The question is whether the inefficiency is so weighty 
that it justifies the costs of a working enforcement mechanism.  George Priest argues that the 
lost efficiency that results from an unregulated market is insufficient to justify collective 
action.  See Priest, supra note 7, at 127–28. 
60.  See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 32, at 804 (noting that mismatches may occur as 
judges who would prefer certain clerks and clerks who would prefer that judge do not end up 
together).   
61.  See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 1, at 449. 
62.  See, e.g., Wald, supra note 10, at 163.  
63.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Priest, supra note 7, at 129–33). 
64.  See id. 
65.  Id. 
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impressive academic study on the characteristics of the clerkship 
market” and had buy-in from law schools and the majority of circuits 
and individual judges, including the D.C. Circuit.66  This Plan, in other 
words, was built to last.   
In many ways, the Plan worked like the earlier attempts at 
regulation.  For instance, it too set fixed hiring dates: “[J]udges could 
only hire clerks after they had entered their third year of law school.”67  
Indeed, as the Plan developed, it set detailed dates for when judges 
could review applications, when they could first call applicants, and 
when they could first interview.68  Because of the buy-in from law 
schools, those dates were intended to hold: law schools were not 
supposed to send letters of recommendation, and without letters of 
recommendation, it is hard for judges to hire.69  The D.C. Circuit—a 
particularly attractive court for would-be clerks—was also firmly behind 
the Plan.70   
Importantly, in 2005, “the federal judiciary also implemented an 
online system to facilitate the application process.”71  This online system 
is OSCAR: the Online System for Clerkship Application and Review.  
OSCAR was designed as a “user-friendly, online resource that 
streamlines federal law clerk and appellate staff attorney hiring” by 
allowing applicants and judges “to easily manage every aspect of the 
hiring process.”72  Instead of having to sort and plow through hundreds 
(if not thousands) of paper applications, judges using OSCAR can easily 
review applications and sort applicants through an online interface.  
OSCAR propped up the Plan because computers do not cheat.73  It did 
not allow judges to review applications before set times.  In this way, 
 
66.  See id. (citing Avery et al., supra note 32); see also id. (explaining that “the study’s 
ultimate recommendation that there be a ‘modified medical match’ system . . . was not 
followed”). 
67.  Id. 
68.  Avery et al., supra note 1, at 450. 
69.  See Avery et al., supra note 32, at 867 (“Making it more difficult for judges to gather 
information will impede their ability to move early, and so (for example) the strategy of 
asking law schools to embargo letters of recommendation . . . .”). 
70.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 24. 
71.  Id. at 23. 
72.  What is OSCAR?, OSCAR, https://oscar.uscourts.gov/about (last visited Nov. 2, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/S8W9-YHM8.  
73.  See generally Mark W. Pletcher & Ludovic C. Ghesquiere, In Restraint of Trade: 
The Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Plan, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 147, 190 (2007) (“While judges, law 
schools, and students have distinct incentives to cheat, machines do not cheat.”). 
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OSCAR “reinforced the Plan’s calendar—judges who wanted to use the 
convenient online system could not easily defect from the Plan’s hiring 
dates.”74 
E. The Hiring Plan’s Collapse 
The Plan, however, like its predecessors, was a failure.  To be sure, 
the Plan lasted longer than all previous attempts.  Nevertheless, it 
ultimately had the same fate.  The following actions contributed to the 
Plan’s demise. 
Some Judges Openly Refused to Follow the Plan 
At the outset, some judges simply declined to follow the Plan.  Judge 
Jerry Smith of the Fifth Circuit, for instance, was open about this.  Soon 
after the Plan was initiated, he explained that no one voted on the Plan, 
he thought the Plan was a bad idea for both judges and applicants, and 
he would not follow it.75  As the Plan’s collapse neared, he again 
described his philosophy:  
I do not follow the unofficial and totally voluntary “hiring plan.”  
No judge, law school, student, or professor is bound by that plan.  
If law professors refuse to provide early recommendation letters, 
I will consider the application without them.  A list of grades can 
be submitted if an official transcript is not available.76 
Other judges eventually took this position too.  Indeed, the Fourth 
Circuit, after an internal debate, officially voted to stop following the 
Plan.77  Eventually other courts followed suit.  Some courts “openly 
acknowledge[d] that most of their judges [did not] follow the plan—
most notably the 4th, 5th, 10th and 11th circuits.”78 
That those circuits were most reluctant to follow the Plan should not 
be surprising.  From the beginning, some complained that the Plan 
disproportionately benefited those judges nearest to the highest-ranked 
 
74.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
75.  See, e.g., Bashman, supra note 16. 
76.  The source for this citation is no longer available online.  Judge Smith, however, has 
confirmed to the author of this Article that this quotation is accurate.  In the interests of full 
disclosure, the author of this Article clerked for Judge Smith from 2007 to 2008.  
77.  Sloan, supra note 35 (‘“The judges on the 4th Circuit voted several years ago to 
bypass the hiring plan altogether,’ said Chief Judge William Traxler Jr.”). 
78.  Id. 
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law schools.79  Courts that are not as accessible to students have an 
incentive to hire outside of the compressed time frame mandated by a 
hiring plan.80   
Some Judges Secretly Refused to Follow the Plan 
Those judges who openly defied the Plan were shadowed by a larger 
group of other judges who secretly hired early.81  Among those in the 
know, the rumors were everywhere.  Indeed, websites like Law Clerk 
Addict (in which applicants anonymously reported when judges were 
interviewing) were created to monitor such secret hiring.82  Those 
applicants who were guileless enough to trust the Plan were at a real 
disadvantage.   
These shadowy defections were augmented by law schools that also 
secretly began sending recommendation letters early.  In 2012, Above 
the Law, the legal community’s go-to site for rumormongering, released 
a memo from Georgetown explaining that it was aware that other law 
schools were sending such letters before the Plan allowed.83  Sending 
letters of recommendation early, of course, only mattered because 
judges were reading those letters.  Many individual law professors were 
willing to send letters early even if their schools were not.  This too 
created unfairness; students whose recommenders toed the line were out 
of luck.   
 
79.  See, e.g., Bashman, supra note 16 (“Any plan with tightly defined deadlines benefits 
mostly the judges in the I-95 corridor between Boston and Richmond, where students can 
schedule a large number of interviews in a compacted period of time.”); Kozinski, supra note 
10, at 1719 (same point). 
80.  Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1719. 
81.  See, e.g., Dave Hoffman, The Quickly Unraveling Clerkship Market, CONCURRING 
OPINIONS (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/09/the-quickly-
unraveling-clerkship-market.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9WEW-CSYW (“Many, many 
federal judges have quietly opted out, by soliciting resumes directly, making calls when they 
please . . . .”). 
82.  See Federal Judges Who Do NOT Follow the Plan for 3Ls, L. CLERK ADDICT, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20100225095049/http://www.lawclerkaddict.com/hiring/offplan 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/YM4P-ATBG.  
83.  See David Lat, The Law Clerk Hiring Plan, R.I.P., ABOVE THE LAW (June 11, 2012, 
3:46 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/06/the-law-clerk-hiring-plan-r-i-p/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/GH8V-8BY4 (“We recently learned that some of our peer schools are 
submitting students’ applications for judicial clerkships in advance of deadlines established by 
the federal law clerk hiring plan.  Because we want to ensure that our students have full 
access to federal judicial clerkship opportunities for the 2013–2014 term, we are adding a June 
11 mailing . . . .”). 
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Some Judges Tried to Skirt the Edges 
At the same time, other judges tried to follow the letter of the Plan 
while undermining its spirit.  The most jarring example of this was the 
informal coffees or other meetings that took place in which judges met 
with potential clerks but did not conduct formal interviews.84  This way 
judges could form alliances with would-be clerks, even though the 
official offer was not extended until when the Plan allowed.85  Some 
judges also took the view that certain hiring did not actually violate the 
Plan, for instance if the judge had a pre-existing relationship with the 
would-be clerk.  The Plan’s categorical language did not contain any 
such exception, but some judges, driven perhaps by motivated 
reasoning, felt it was implicit. 
Another, more subtle, form of Plan-skirting involved hiring 
graduates instead of law students.86  The Plan did not regulate applicants 
who had already passed the third year of law school, so judges could 
interview and hire those applicants whenever they wanted.87  Many did 
“because hiring a full cohort of clerks on a single day is difficult.”88  In 
other words, the Plan not only impacted when hiring occurred, it also 
changed who was hired.89  Granted, alumni hiring did not technically 
violate the Plan.  But it did undermine the idea that hiring would be 
regularized.  It also was frustrating for law students who realized that 
clerkships were being snatched up before they could even apply.  That 
reality undoubtedly prompted more applications from 2Ls who wanted 
to be in the mix.   
 
84.  See, e.g., David Lat, Clerkship Hiring Is Getting Earlier and Earlier, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Apr. 11, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/04/clerkship-hiring-is-getting-
earlier-and-earlier/, archived at http://perma.cc/R8S4-NEA3 (noting “the current practice of 
judges informally getting to know particularly promising applicants in advance of the official 
Plan period, through lunches or coffees or the like, and then making official offers on the 
magic day”).  
85.  Id. 
86.  See, e.g., id. (“[S]ome judges, wanting to avoid the insanity, will just start hiring 
more clerks ‘off cycle’—e.g., law school graduates already working as lawyers, who are not 
covered by any of the Plan rules (which, of course, are advisory to begin with).”).  
87.  Id. 
88.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 25. 
89.  See infra notes 137–39. 
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The “Chump” Principle 
All the while, the “chump” principle then began kicking in.90  As 
Dan Kahan has explained, “[e]ven a strong propensity to obey the law 
. . . can be undercut by a person’s ‘desire not to be suckered.’”91  In those 
situations in which it looks like everyone else is bending the rules with 
no consequence, it can be hard to stand fast.  If the chump principle can 
sometimes apply to criminal acts like violating tax laws, or civil 
infractions like ignoring driving rules, it surely has even more purchase 
for entirely voluntary codes of conduct. 
The chump principle also applies to judges.  Even judges who 
previously followed the Plan stopped doing so when they saw others 
ignoring it.  For instance, then-Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe of the 
Tenth Circuit justified her court’s decision to not follow the Plan by 
stating that, “[q]uite frankly, we just saw that other areas of the country 
were not following the plan.”92  That same analysis surely went through 
the minds of many judges. 
The D.C. Circuit’s Decision 
The D.C. Circuit then delivered the coup de grâce in January 2013.93  
The D.C. Circuit largely stuck to the Plan for years.  Indeed, former-
Chief Judge Harry Edwards of that court was a key player in designing 
the system.94  Because the D.C. Circuit is such a prestigious court, it had 
 
90.  See generally Janet Novack, Are You a Chump, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2001, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2001/0305/122.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4TU9-EKVD 
(explaining that the realization that many others are not following the tax laws may lead to 
less compliance by others); see also Avery et al., supra note 1, at 469 (describing “Thomas 
Schelling’s ‘dying seminar’”) (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR 91–92 (1978)). 
91.  Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 604 
(1996) (quoting Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory 
of Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 403 (1994)). 
92.  Sloan, supra note 35. 
93.  Aaron L. Nielson, Law Clerk Hiring Plan is Dead, and Good Riddance, NAT’L 
L.J., Feb. 11, 2013, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202586922678&The_la
w_clerk_hiring_plan_is_dead_and_good_riddance, archived at http://perma.cc/J2WF-28CB. 
94.  See Debra M. Strauss, From the Judicial Clerkship Files: Putting It in Perspective—
Understanding the History of the Timing Issue and Making Lemonade, ABOVE THE LAW 
(Nov. 7, 2013, 2:08 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/career-files/from-the-judicial-clerkship-files-
putting-it-in-perspective-understanding-the-history-of-the-timing-issue-and-making-lemonad
e, archived at http://perma.cc/XF7S-URS5. 
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an anchoring effect for the entire Plan.95  Some applicants waited until 
the D.C. Circuit made decisions before considering other options.96 
Eventually, however, the D.C. Circuit gave up.  Invoking the chump 
principle, the D.C. Circuit explained that: 
Although the judges of this circuit would uniformly prefer to 
continue hiring law clerks pursuant to the Federal Law Clerk 
Hiring Plan, it has become apparent that the plan is no longer 
working.  Because participation in the plan is voluntary, a 
significant percentage of all United States circuit judges must 
agree to follow it if it is to work appropriately.  During the past 
few years, a significant and increasing number of circuit judges 
around the country have hired in advance of the plan’s interview 
and offer dates, and it is likely that they will continue to do so.  
As a result, continued adherence to the plan is no longer fair and 
equitable to either students or judges.97 
The D.C. Circuit explained that although it is willing “to work with 
the judges of the other circuits to develop an appropriate successor to 
the current plan,” each of its judges could hire when he or she 
“determines to be appropriate.”98  The court also explained that none of 
its judges would “give ‘exploding offers’ . . . .  Rather, when a judge of 
this circuit gives a candidate an offer, the candidate will have a 
reasonable time to consider the offer and interview with other judges 
before accepting or declining.”99 
The Official Collapse 
After the D.C. Circuit’s decision, everything fell apart quickly.100  
Students and judges all around the country frantically tried to come to 
terms with the new landscape.  For instance, in a last-ditch effort “to 
stay relevant in the wake of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the OSCAR 
 
95.  See Nielson, supra note 1, at 24. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Notice Regarding Law Clerk Hiring, supra note 5. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id.  Given the value of a D.C. Circuit clerkship, a promise to not issue exploding 
offers in many instances has little effect.  After all, as George Priest has explained, judges 
outside of the D.C. Circuit make early offers—and by parity of reasoning, issue exploding 
offers—to compete with the D.C. Circuit.  See Priest, supra note 7, at 155, 163.  Although it 
happens, it is rare for a clerkship applicant to turn down a D.C. Circuit clerkship to take 
another offer.   
100.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 24. 
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Working Group judges reset the Plan’s critical date to June 28, 2013.”101  
That effort was short lived.  In November 2013, OSCAR, bowing to 
reality, officially began allowing 2L students to apply through the online 
system.102   
III. THE REASON WHY THE PLAN COLLAPSED 
The reasons why the Plan failed should be obvious to anyone with an 
understanding of markets—it’s really hard to run a cartel.  Indeed, “[i]t 
ignores decades of antitrust insight . . . to think that massive 
coordination could be sustained in a market with hundreds of competing 
judges, little transparency, and no enforcement mechanism.”103  The 
temptation to cheat is just too strong.  This principle, which is 
“[s]tandard economic theory,”104 applies with full force in the clerkship 
context.  “Cartels do not work.  People cheat.  Judges cheat.  Law 
schools cheat.”105 
It may be jarring to characterize the Plan as a cartel.  When one 
thinks of a cartel, images of smoke-filled rooms populated by gangsters 
and nineteenth century tycoons spring to mind.106  But even if a 
clerkship plan is more noble,107 the mechanism is the same: collective 
action to change a market equilibrium.  For a price-fixing agreement to 
work, all the members of the cartel must agree on a price and then 
honor that agreement.  Regulating the clerkship market is similar; to 
change the timing equilibrium that results from an unregulated market, 
judges must agree to change their hiring practices.  Accordingly, 
although the ends sought by the Plan may be more commendable,108 
what it takes for collective action to succeed is no different.   
 
101.  Id. at 25 n.7. 
102.  See OSCAR De-links from the Hiring Plan, supra note 6. 
103.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 24. 
104.  Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of 
Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 842–43 (describing the demise of past efforts 
at clerkship-hiring regulation). 
105.  Todd Zywicki, Herding Cats, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 239, 239 (2002) (quoting Avery et 
al., supra note 32, at 860 tbl.21) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
106.  Cf. Tefft W. Smith, An Iconoclastic Attack on the Antitrust Community: A Review 
of Edwin S. Rockefeller’s The Antitrust Religion, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 436, 441 (2010) 
(book review) (discussing the Standard Oil Trust which arguably helped instigate the 
“Antitrust Religion”). 
107.  But see Kozinksi, supra note 10, at 1719. 
 108.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 106, at 454 (explaining that hard-core “price fixing is 
like selling drugs to school children”). 
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Likewise, as happens with many regulatory efforts,109 the Plan had 
unintended consequences.  The Plan actually encouraged injudicious 
conduct and changed not just when but whom judges hired.  Those 
unintended consequences further doomed the Plan.  
A. What a Successful Cartel Needs 
One of the most important insights of antitrust economics is that it is 
hard to make a cartel work.  Although there are examples of long-
lasting cartels, it nonetheless is the case that “[e]conomic theory 
confidently predicts that cartels should be short-lived, as firms succumb 
to the temptation to cheat or free ride on their agreement.”110      
As Ian Ayers has explained, economists typically consider the 
following factors in determining whether a cartel can succeed: 
To collude effectively, firms must be able (1) to reach an 
agreement, (2) to detect breaches of the agreement, and (3) to 
punish firms that breach.  Advocates of the structural approach 
have suggested a variety of market characteristics that affect 
these conditions.  Some characteristics (such as seller 
concentration, or the homogeneity of the product) relate to the 
ease of reaching an agreement; others (such as stable demand, or 
announcement of the lowest sealed bid) affect the ability to 
detect price-cutting breaches.111 
While all of those factors matter, the most important element of a 
successful cartel may be its enforcement mechanism, i.e., the way that 
wayward participants are punished for deviating from the agreement.112  
The lack of a viable enforcement mechanism is one of the most common 
reasons why cartels fail.113  In fact, whether there is an enforcement 
mechanism in place is probative evidence as to whether a cartel exists at 
 
109.  See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 1, at 27 (explaining that “regulation that is amply 
justified in principle may go terribly wrong in practice” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Political 
Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1390 (1994)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)).  
110.  Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. & ECON. 241, 242 
(1996). 
111.  Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 
87 COLUM L. REV. 295, 296 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
112.  See, e.g., id. (noting that one “condition for successful collusion” is “being able to 
punish breach”). 
113.  See, e.g., Dick, supra note 110, at 249. 
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all.114  As the Third Circuit has noted, “a cartel cannot survive absent 
some enforcement mechanism because otherwise the incentives to cheat 
are too great.”115  In other words, without a viable enforcement 
mechanism, the temptation among the cartel members to undersell their 
co-conspirators is just too strong, even if a market is susceptible to 
collusion.   
It follows a fortiori that an enforcement mechanism is critical where 
the market is not otherwise susceptible to collusion.  Put differently, 
there is a sliding scale.  If a market has few participants, is transparent, 
and is for homogeneous products, there still must be an enforcement 
mechanism, but it need not be as powerful.  But the more a market 
diverges from that simple model, the more an enforcement mechanism 
must do.  Speaking broadly, this is the question facing a cartelist: does 
cheating produce a higher expected value than not cheating?  
Answering that question involves discounting the benefits of cheating by 
the odds of being caught and punished.  If cheating will be certainly 
detected, then the punishment need not be weighty.  But if detection is 
unlikely, then the punishment must be more severe.   
This basic building block of antitrust analysis explains why cartels 
and organized crime go hand in glove.  In markets where the probability 
of detection is low and the penalty is only a slap on the wrist, the 
benefits of cheating seem high.  But if the penalty is a broken leg, or 
worse, then even if the odds of detection are slight, a rational actor 
would pause before defecting.  In other words, a realistic threat of a 
mob hit may keep the members of a cartel in line.116  In markets not 
otherwise susceptible to collusion, however, and where the threat of 
gangland violence isn’t on the table, a cartel can only persist if other 
severe sanctions are available.  The longest-lasting cartels, 
unsurprisingly, may be those backed by the government, with heavy 
fines or even imprisonment serving as the enforcement mechanism.117 
 
114.  See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 111, at 298 (noting that the “ability to punish is a 
precondition of collusion”). 
115.  Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
116.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel 
Stability, 31 J. CORP. L. 453, 461 (2006) (“One solution, most associated with organized crime, 
is to kill the snitch.  If the price of confession is death, not confessing becomes a dominant 
strategy regardless of the numbers in the prisoner’s dilemma matrix.”). 
117.  For instance, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 has been 
characterized as a cartel.  See, e.g., Darren Filson, Edward Keen, Eric Fruits & Thomas 
Borcherding, Market Power and Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical Test, 44 J.L. & 
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B. Enforcement Mechanisms are Expensive 
Powerful enforcement mechanisms, however, are often economically 
costly—i.e., it requires giving up a lot to have an enforcement 
mechanism that works.  In the price-fixing context, for instance, one 
possible enforcement mechanism is excess production capacity.118  The 
idea is that if one agreeing party deviates from the agreement, another 
could flood the market with the product to reduce prices even further, 
thus leaving the initial cheater worse off than if it just complied with the 
agreement.119  Excess capacity, however, is obviously expensive.  Of 
course, those cartels that rely on government enforcement are also 
costly.    
C. The Plan’s Enforcement Mechanisms Were Too Weak 
These foundational antitrust principles explain why the Plan failed.  
Its enforcement mechanisms were just too weak.120  Those judges 
competing for clerks had incentives to cheat and not follow the Plan, 
and the Plan’s methods of preventing such cheating were woefully 
ineffective. 
1. OSCAR Did Not Replace Old-Fashioned Mail 
The Plan’s primary enforcement mechanism appears to have been 
OSCAR.121  OSCAR is easy to use.  For judges who receive hundreds or 
even thousands of applications, it is wonderful to be able to 
electronically sort them and not have an office full of piles of paper.  But 
OSCAR was supposed to come at a price.  OSCAR could in theory 
force judges to follow the dates set by the Plan.  Again, computers do 
not cheat.  The enforcement mechanism, accordingly, was the loss of 
OSCAR.  Judges who wanted the benefits of OSCAR could, in theory, 
only obtain them by following the Plan.    
OSCAR, however, could not carry the weight placed upon it.  A 
 
ECON. 465, 466 (2001). 
118.  See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. 
White, Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 424 (2011) 
(“Because courts will not enforce cartel agreements, a cartel must devise enforcement 
mechanisms and threats.  A common threat is to hold excess capacity . . . .”). 
119.  See Ayres, supra note 111, at 304 n.40.  
120.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 864 (“The problem is the familiar one of trying to 
sustain a self-enforcing cartel—one in which there is no outside sanction for defection.”). 
121.  See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 35 (“The system will not release student applications to 
judges until the September kickoff date, which helps encourage compliance.”). 
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computer system is convenient, not essential.  Applicants and 
recommenders could always apply the old-fashioned way: the post 
office.  This meant that when OSCAR would not allow 2Ls to apply, 
those 2Ls would just send materials in hard copy.  It is not as if judges 
do not read their mail.  In fact, judges sometimes posted openings on 
OSCAR, received hard-copy applications in response, and then 
arranged interviews.122  In short, so long as the U.S. Postal Service 
delivers mail to federal courthouses, judges who want to hire 2L 
applicants will be able to do so.   
2. Law Schools Had Incentives to Cheat 
Nor could the Plan depend on law schools.  If law schools would not 
send letters of recommendation, then many (but not all) judges would 
not hire.123  And, in theory, law schools could speak ill to students of 
judges who hired early, thus discouraging the practice.  Career 
counselors could also encourage students to hold fast and not apply 
early.  In these ways law schools could make it harder for judges to hire 
and potentially could even harm the reputation of those judges who 
were looking to do so. 
The problem is that law schools are competing against each other.  
Just as judges have incentives to move early, law schools have those 
same incentives.  This means that when some law schools began sending 
materials to judges before the Plan allowed, it was only a matter of time 
before they all did.124  And even if the law school itself was unwilling to 
do so, some faculty members were.125   
Nor were law schools likely to say no to federal judges, much less 
deride them to their students.  Some career counselors and law 
professors undoubtedly discouraged students from sending early 
applications,126 but would they really tell a judge who called on the 
telephone that they would not provide information about would-be 
clerks, especially if they knew that doing so could easily cost the student 
the clerkship?  It is hard to imagine such dogmatic devotion to the Plan 
lasting very long.  Given just how scarce clerkships are, it is incredible to 
 
122.  See, e.g., id. (explaining the dynamic). 
123.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 867. 
124.  See Lat, supra note 83 (discussing Georgetown’s exit from the Plan as a reaction to 
exits by peer schools). 
125.  See Pletcher & Ghesquiere, supra note 73, at 156.  
126.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 867 (“[T]he temptation to talk to a judge who has 
already started gathering information about other candidates may be considerable.”). 
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think that law schools would create black lists of judges whom students 
should avoid.  Law schools are simply not institutionally designed to 
prevent judges from hiring law students.    
3. The D.C. Circuit Was Not a Strong Enough Anchor 
One of the most powerful things the Plan had going for it was the 
cooperation of the D.C. Circuit.  The D.C. Circuit, of course, is a unique 
court.  For clerkship applicants, the D.C. Circuit is attractive in at least 
two respects.  First, the court is in Washington, D.C., the same place 
where a lot of the nation’s top legal jobs are located.  Because many 
clerks go on to work there (or have a significant other who is already 
there), being in D.C. is valuable.  Second, because of the court’s national 
reputation,127 it has remarkably capable judges.  Unlike other circuits 
with one or two judges who regularly feed to the Supreme Court, the 
D.C. Circuit is full of such judges.128 
Because the D.C. Circuit—with its benefits to clerks—was 
committed to the Plan, many top students (a number far exceeding the 
D.C. Circuit clerkship slots) were reluctant to accept clerkships 
elsewhere until that court had made its decisions.129  So those students 
would not apply before the Plan allowed.  The D.C. Circuit thus served 
as an enforcement mechanism of sorts; judges who wanted to hire early 
potentially sacrificed the ability to compete for some of the top 
applicants in the pool.     
The gravitational pull of the D.C. Circuit, however, was not strong 
enough.  There are many talented judges all around the country, 
including in other attractive cities.  Even those students who believe 
they are realistically in the running for the D.C. Circuit are often thrilled 
to accept clerkships elsewhere.130  The D.C. Circuit is a great court, but 
the experience and prospects that its clerks have are not so categorically 
 
127.  Cf. Howard Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, HOW APPEALING (Aug. 2, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2004_08_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/K4HM-NPKD (“Gerhard Casper, my Dean at the time, was nonplussed; he 
said that he could understand jumping to the D.C. Circuit but not to a regional circuit.”). 
128. See David R. Stras, Secret Agents: Using Law Clerks Effectively, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 
151, 155 tbl.2, 157 tbl.3 (2014). 
129.  See, e.g., Carl W. Tobias, Tips for Capturing 2014 Federal Clerkships, 66 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 145, 145−47 (2013), http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2013/
10/Tobias_Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8YHK-R8JL. 
130.  See Priest, supra note 7, at 137. 
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different that it can prevent unraveling.131 
4. Informal Stigma  
Finally, stigma can be an enforcement mechanism.132  No judge 
wants to be written off as a bad actor.  In theory, if judges were 
stigmatized for not following the Plan, hiring would be different.  But 
there is no such stigma—or if there is, it is very slight.  Tellingly, some of 
the nation’s leading jurists did not follow the Plan, including apparently 
feeder judges from across the ideological spectrum.133  These are judges 
of real standing.  Potential harm to reputation was not enough to keep 
the Plan afloat.   
D. Unintended Consequences 
Importantly, not only did the Plan fail to include an enforcement 
mechanism powerful enough to succeed, it also had serious unintended 
consequences.  These consequences further doomed the Plan.   
For instance, perversely, the Plan encouraged exploding (and 
vanishing) offers.134  After all, “[i]n a compressed hiring season, judges 
must hire quickly—hence more exploding offers.”135  Interestingly, this 
dynamic would almost certainly have been worse had the Plan worked.  
The Plan, with its set deadlines, attempts to direct all hiring to a 
compressed time period.  But a compressed time period increases the 
temptation to issue exploding or vanishing offers.  If everyone is hired 
on the same day, then there is no time to delay.  From a judge’s 
perspective, an applicant with an offer in hand may wait a few hours and 
then say no.  All the while, other applicants are snatched up.  The judge 
in such a situation would face few choices, none ideal.  She could (1) 
give the applicant time and not make other offers, all the while hoping 
that the applicant eventually accepts or that other good candidates are 
not hired in the meantime; (2) issue an exploding offer; or (3) continue 
to interview candidates and make offers to the good ones (which, if 
those offers are accepted, may mean that the offer to the initial 
candidate is a vanishing offer).  The noblest option is the first, but one 
can at least understand, though not excuse, a frustrated judge’s 
 
131.  See, e.g., id. at 155, 163.   
132.  See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 116, at 461–62.   
133.  Federal Judges Who Do NOT Follow the Plan for 3Ls, supra note 82. 
134.  Nielson, supra note 1, at 25. 
135.  Id.  
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weakness.  When the clock is ticking, the opportunity cost of holding an 
offer open is high. 
The Plan’s collapse, accordingly, diluted the incentive to issue 
exploding offers.  Judge Smith presciently cited this precise point as a 
reason to not participate in the Plan at all.136  The fact that the Plan, 
designed to prevent one of the perceived problems with an unregulated 
market (2L hiring) actually made the other perceived problem 
(injudicious conduct) worse was a profoundly pernicious unintended 
consequence.   
But there was another key unintended consequence.  Not only did 
the Plan incentivize exploding offers, it also encouraged judges to not 
hire law students at all.137  Because of the Plan, some judges decided to 
hire alumni applicants rather than student applicants—and so comply 
with the Plan—to avoid the chaos of hiring all the clerks on a single 
day.138  As Richard Revesz observed, “some judges don’t like the hiring 
frenzy that takes place on the first day they can interview 3Ls under the 
rules[.] . . .  A way to avoid that and still comply with the rules is to hire 
alumni.” 139  While practicing attorneys are not bad hires, not all judges 
prefer them.  In other words, imagine two applicants, A and B.  
Although the two are similar, all else being equal, a particular judge 
would prefer A to B.  But the applicants are not equal: A is a student 
and B is a graduate.  If the judge were to hire B instead of A solely 
because B could be hired without the Plan’s restrictions, that is a 
problem. 
IV. CLERKSHIP HIRING TODAY  
So what does the clerkship market look like today?  It is hard to say 
for certain because the market is still largely opaque; while judges post 
openings on OSCAR, it is difficult to know when judges are really 
looking at applicants rather than just collecting resumes.  Nevertheless, 
there are anecdotes.  The information in the next section reflects 
insights gathered from numerous conversations with judges, students, 
and faculty.  This anecdotal information, moreover, is consistent with 
the limited data that has been collected to date.140  As an added bonus, it 
 
136.  See, e.g., Bashman, supra note 16. 
137.  See, e.g., Lat, supra note 84. 
138.  See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 35. 
139.  See, e.g., id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
140.  See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 129, at 146–47; Carl Tobias, Salvaging the 2013 Federal 
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also happens to jibe with commonsense.   
A. 2L Hiring 
First, as one would expect, the date that hiring occurs is moving up 
for many judges, particularly those serving on appellate courts.  While 
not all hiring now occurs in the 2L year, much of it does.141  The author 
personally heard one prominent appellate judge urge students to apply 
no later than January of the second year and earlier if possible; this 
advice is consistent with what other judges are saying.  Any applicant for 
a federal court of appeals clerkship with a passable writing sample ought 
to plan on applying as soon as the first semester 2L grades are available, 
and perhaps even earlier.   
District courts, however, appear to be different, at least somewhat.  
It seems that many district courts are not moving as quickly.142  Upon 
reflection, this is unremarkable.  A district court clerkship is a different 
beast.  Whereas an appellate court clerkship is quite similar to what a 
student does in law school—reading cases, discerning doctrine, writing it 
up, with a dose of cite-checking thrown in for good measure—a district 
court clerkship requires additional skills.  District court clerks handle 
different tasks, many of which are unfamiliar to most law students, 
including juggling a large docket and sometimes engaging in contact 
with the practicing bar.  The skills used by appellate clerks are obviously 
not irrelevant; district court clerks also need to be able to read cases and 
write well.  But those skills are not sufficient.  It thus makes sense that 
district court judges may be more wary of basing hiring decisions on 1L 
grades, at least at the margins.  A phone call from a practicing lawyer, 
perhaps the applicant’s 2L summer employer, may be especially 
meaningful.  For these reasons, it also makes a lot of sense for district 
court judges to hire law graduates instead of law students.   
Some district court judges also may hesitate to compete directly with 
appellate courts.  Interestingly, it appears that a fair number of students 
arrange a clerkship with an appellate judge first, and then secure 
another clerkship (sometimes to occur before the appellate clerkship) 
with a district court.  The inverse is still more common, but things may 
be changing.   
 
Law Clerk Hiring Season, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 243, 245 (2013).   
141.  See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 129, at 145–46 (explaining that numerous courts of 
appeals are hiring 2Ls, especially prestigious or otherwise desirable appellate courts). 
142.  See Tobias, supra note 140, at 245. 
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B. The 1L Year Matters More 
Second, and related to the first point, with hiring moving up, judges 
must make decisions with less information.  This means that the 1L year, 
already the most important,143 is now even more important.  Everything 
about the year matters more: first-year grades; the jobs students find 
during the 1L year for the summer; and faculty contacts. 
That last point deserves reflection.  Professors that teach 1L classes 
can expect to be asked to write even more recommendation letters; 
students often will not know anyone else on the faculty, certainly not 
well enough to ask for a letter.  Given that reality, law schools should 
consider expanding the pool of professors who teach in the 1L year or 
find other ways to create meaningful contacts between more of the 
faculty and the first-year students. 
C. Top Law Schools Are—Or At Least Should Be—Doing Better 
It also appears to be the case that the top law schools are doing 
better in the post-Plan world.  If this is happening, it makes sense.  If 
there are two clerkships candidates, one from the University of Chicago 
and one from a lower-ranked school, and neither has had time to 
prepare a good writing sample, a judge often will (reasonably) conclude 
that the Chicago applicant could write well with time, but will wonder a 
bit more about the other applicant.  After all, although some students at 
lower-ranked schools can write well, not as many can, so that hire is 
riskier.  Uncertainty thus favors the better brand and those students 
with better undergraduate credentials.144  Similarly, there is less time to 
build faculty support for candidates.  This also helps the Chicago 
applicant because Chicago students, even without substantial faculty 
support, are relatively safe hires.  On the other hand, at lower-ranked 
schools, sometimes a judge might wonder if even the best student in a 
particular class is good enough, especially for a prestigious clerkship.  So 
class rank alone might not provide sufficient information about 
applications from lower-ranked schools; a judge needs to be assured by 
the faculty that the student has what it takes.145  If the faculty at a lower-
 
143.  See, e.g., John O. Sonsteng with Donna Ward, Colleen Bruce & Michael Petersen, 
A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 344 (2007) (“[F]irst-year grades are considered by many as the most 
important of a law student’s academic career.”). 
144.  See Priest, supra note 7, at 180. 
145.  Cf. Dan Filler, Supreme Court Clerk Feeder Judges And Snaring Those Clerkships 
When You Didn’t Go To Yale, CONCURRING OPINIONS (May 11, 2006), 
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ranked school does not have enough time to get to know a student, 
however, then that student, despite abundant talent, may be out of luck. 
On the other hand, the fact that some top schools have moved away 
from letter grades (or even grades at all, at least for part of the 1L 
year)146 could hurt their students.147  I suspect, but cannot prove, that 
schools like the University of Chicago that retain rigorous grades will do 
disproportionately well in the new clerkship environment.  After one 
year of law school, there is more information regarding the legal 
aptitude of a Chicago applicant than of a Harvard or Yale applicant.  To 
be sure, while a randomly selected student from Chicago may, on 
average, be a touch less accomplished than a randomly selected student 
from Yale, at least according to traditional measures, a top student at 
Chicago is better than an average student at Yale.  This means that the 
harder it is for judges to know whether a particular student is good or 
average, the more likely they are to lean towards schools like Chicago.  
Granted, this does not mean that Chicago will surpass Harvard or Yale 
in the race, but it may suggest that schools without rigorous grades are 
not obtaining as many clerkships for their students as they could.148 
D. Many Practicing Attorneys Are Still Being Hired 
Finally, many judges are still hiring graduates instead of law 
students—though presumably current students are doing relatively 
better in the post-Plan world.149  Some judges prefer hiring graduates 
 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/05/supreme_court_c.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AMQ-79BC (“The faculty also have to make decisions about prioritizing 
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146.  See, e.g., Joshua M. Silverstein, A Case for Grade Inflation in Legal Education, 47 
U.S.F. L. REV. 487, 499 n.49 (2013) (“Several first-tier institutions—such as Yale, Harvard, 
and Stanford—have eliminated letter grades altogether by moving to modified Pass/Fail 
systems.”). 
147.  Cf. Priest, supra note 7, at 179 (“Yale students should be expected to be at an 
increasing disadvantage because of the absence of first semester grades.”). 
148.  To be sure, this hypothesis could prove wrong.  Priest believes that Yale clerkship 
applicants, for instance, may do better when fewer of their law grades are available.  See id. at 
180.  One can imagine scenarios in which making it harder to distinguish between students at 
top schools benefits more of those schools’ clerkship applicants.  Similarly, without grade 
dilution, it is possible some students would not attend a particular law school at all, meaning 
that when a law school changes its grade policies, it may also change the quality of its pool of 
clerkship applicants.  Such questions are beyond the scope of this Article. 
149.  See Avery et al., supra note 32, at 890 tbl.A5. 
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and do so regularly.150  While it is problematic if judges hire alumni 
instead of current students because of the Plan, some judges honestly 
prefer hiring more seasoned clerks even with all else being equal.  In 
other words, this trend, which intensified during the Plan’s heyday, has 
not gone away.  It is also likely that some judges initially began hiring 
graduates because of the Plan and then came to realize that those 
candidates make better clerks, so now they hire such applicants without 
the Plan. 
V. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL LAW CLERK HIRING 
Against this backdrop, what does the future hold?  At least as of 
now, there does not appear to be a lot of enthusiasm for a new hiring 
plan.  This Article submits that no new plan is likely because the costs to 
judges of an effective enforcement mechanism are too high relative to 
the benefits, at least for those benefits that have been identified to date.  
This means that unless new benefits change the cost-benefit calculus, the 
unregulated market will be here to stay.  This is not to say that the 
current state of affairs is “hunky-dory,”151 only that the identified gains 
to date do not justify the costs of an enforcement mechanism powerful 
enough to ensure coordinated action.  That is why more powerful—and 
more costly—enforcement mechanisms have not been adopted. 
Identifying new benefits that are weighty enough to tip the scales, 
moreover, seems unlikely.  Although this Article sketches three 
potential new benefits, it does not appear that any of them would justify 
a new hiring plan because less costly alternatives may already be 
beginning to mitigate the concerns associated with an unregulated 
clerkship market.  
A. Potential Enforcement Mechanisms Appear Too Costly 
One reason that there has not been a major push for a new hiring 
plan is that an appropriate enforcement mechanism has not been 
identified.  Many of the ideas for a more powerful enforcement 
mechanism (such as adopting a medical matching model) have already 
been proposed, considered, and not adopted.  The reason seems to be 
that such enforcement mechanisms are too costly.  This section discusses 
several possible enforcement mechanisms and explains why those 
mechanisms are unlikely to carry the day.   
 
150.  See, e.g., Lat, supra note 84.  
151.  Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1707. 
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1. The Medical Matching Model 
The most common proposal for a real enforcement mechanism is to 
adopt the medical matching model.  In its strongest form, it would work 
something like this: 
On the medical side, all institutions agree to a match process to 
assign graduates to particular programs.  Each potential 
applicant lists the internships and residencies that he or she 
would like to join in the order of preference.  Each institution 
lists the applicants it would like to employ in order of preference.  
A computer program then combines the two lists in an effort to 
satisfy two simple conditions: (1) no applicant is assigned to a[n] 
internship or residency if there is some other that the applicant 
prefers that also prefers that applicant, and (2) no institution 
receives an applicant if there is available some other applicant 
that it prefers.152 
The reason why this might work is that, in theory, no hiring could 
occur unless the computer approves it.  That is a powerful enforcement 
mechanism.  But there are also weaker forms of this proposal.  The 
Chicago-Harvard Study, for instance, urged a “modified medical 
match.”153  This would be a voluntary program, but no clerk hired by a 
judge who did not participate could later be hired by the Supreme 
Court.154   
This idea has been proposed for decades but not adopted.155  This is 
not an accident.  A medical matching program in the context of law 
schools would cost too much.156  As Judge Kozinksi has explained, 
judges do not just want good clerks; they want a team of good clerks.157  
Many judges also want diversity; they do not want all of the clerks to 
have gone to the same school or have the same type of background.158  
 
152.  Richard A. Epstein, Ending the Mad Scramble: An Experimental Matching Plan for 
Federal Clerkships, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 43 (2006); see also Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1721 
n.29. 
153.  See Avery et al., supra note 32, at 871. 
154.  Id. at 875–76. 
155.  See, e.g., Wald, supra note 10, at 163. 
156.  See Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk 
Selection Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 GEO. L.J. 1749 (1995) (arguing that the 
federal judiciary is a very different context than the medical community). 
157.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1722 (“How does the judge tell the computer 
how much to downgrade that particular combination?  How can the judge even know?”). 
158.  See, e.g., Wald, supra note 10, at 161. 
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This means the selection of the first clerk impacts the second clerk and 
so on.  In other words, adopting a “medical match” is not costless; it 
would change the way many judges like to operate their chambers.  The 
fact that judges have not moved towards this sort of approach, despite 
its prominence and the failure of all the other attempts to regulate the 
clerkship market, strongly suggests that judges are not willing to trade 
their ability to assemble a cohesive team of clerks for greater 
marketplace order.  While an algorithm, in theory, could be created to 
manage some of this (e.g., gender mix, school mix, etc.),159 it is far from 
certain that an algorithm could create the mix a judge is looking for,160 
especially because a judge may not know ex ante.  Some may not 
consider this to be a serious problem, but others disagree.161     
But the problems run deeper.  A medical match would also be 
expensive for the judiciary and applicants alike.  For instance, the actual 
medical matching program employs a large team of well-credentialed 
professionals to manage it.162  Those costs are spread out over many 
thousands of would-be residents.163  Undoubtedly, some of that 
organizational structure could be scaled down for the federal judiciary, 
but likely not proportionately.  This matters because the number of 
clerkship applicants, although large, is much smaller than the number of 
residency applicants.164  At the same time, a medical match would be 
expensive for students.  For students on the East Coast, it may not be 
onerous to hop on the train to New York or Washington, D.C.  Not so, 
however, for students in the Mountain West.  Traveling within the 
Tenth Circuit is difficult; it is more than a thousand miles from Provo, 
Utah, to Oklahoma City.  But travel is necessary.  Otherwise, how 
would students know the order to rank judges, or vice versa?  Medical 
students schedule lots of trips in hopes of obtaining a multiple-year 
position; is this really the best use of resources in the clerkship context, 
 
159.  See Avery et al., supra note 32, at 880. 
160.  Cf. Wald, supra note 10, at 162 (noting the “subtle factors” a judge considers). 
161.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 884. 
162.  See NRMP Staff Profiles, THE MATCH, http://www.nrmp.org/about/staff/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/4BDT-8HKM (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
163.  NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, RESULTS AND DATA 2014: MAIN 
RESIDENCY MATCH, at v (2014), available at http://www.nrmp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/0
4/Main-Match-Results-and-Data-2014.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DK5F-9YV7 
(“Applicants registered for the 2014 Match reached an all time high of 40,394 . . . .”). 
164.  See Ed Finkel, Crunching Clerks: Funding Cuts and a Tougher Job Market Tighten 
the Competition, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2010, at 19, 19 (noting that 10,722 people applied through 
OSCAR for clerkships during the 2010–2011 court year). 
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for a one-year gig?165  One reason, after all, why students may accept 
clerkship offers instead of continuing to play the field is travel is not 
cheap or easy and the first judge is often a good enough match.  That 
says something about the economics of the situation, especially for those 
potential clerks of limited means.   
It also is not at all clear that the medical matching model is always 
good thing to begin with, even for doctors.166  The actual medical 
matching program, for instance, was challenged as a violation of the 
antitrust laws!167  A group of students brought a putative class action 
challenging the medical matching program as a cartel designed to 
artificially deflate wages and increase hours by stifling competition.168  
While the case was pending, Congress enacted a statute preventing 
antitrust challenges to the program.169  The notion that medical 
matching deflates salaries and makes working conditions worse is at 
least plausible.  In other words, although the idea behind matching may 
have been a noble one, it too may have anticompetitive effects.  Is this 
really the path that the federal judiciary wants to take?   
Finally, and perhaps most fatal, a medical match model may not 
actually work.  As the Chicago-Harvard Study explains, judges and 
applicants may “cheat” and enter into “side deals” where both sides 
agree to rank the other highly.170  Indeed, “it is estimated that 10% to 
15% of medical students (and of course the corresponding hospitals) 
cheat on the medical residency match in this way,” and “given the much 
smaller market for judicial clerks, cheating is likely to be more 
prevalent” if the program were used for clerkship hiring.171  To be sure, 
there may be ways to reduce cheating, for instance by programming “a 
small degree of randomization in the match to destabilize the informal 
 
165.  See, e.g., Amy Ho, How A Nobel Economist Ruined The Residency Matching 
System For Newly Minted M.D.’s, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/theapothecary/2014/04/15/how-a-nobel-economist-ruined-the-residency-matching-system
-for-newly-minted-m-d-s/, archived at http://perma.cc/T67W-BDDH (“Financially, the Match 
is devastating.  Assume a student applies for 35 programs in one specialty, receives 20 
interview offers and accepts 12; these are conservative estimates . . . .”). 
166.  See, e.g., id. (discussing the flaws of the medical match). 
167.  See Jung v. Ass’n. of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (D.D.C. 2004). 
168.  Id.  
169.  Public Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, § 207, 118 Stat. 596, 
611−14; see also Ho, supra note 165. 
170.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 883–84. 
171.  Priest, supra note 7, at 140 (citing Avery et al, supra note 32, at 870–71). 
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understandings.”172  But what if this is not enough?  Would even more 
“randomization”—i.e., mismatches, as judges who want applicants and 
applicants who want judges are barred from working together—be 
necessary?  In any event, even if limiting autonomy this way was 
accepted as a necessary evil, the fact remains that all of this adds to the 
costs and complexity of the endeavor.  And the more complexity 
created, the more likely it would be that unintended consequences 
would crop up.  It is no wonder that judges are not racing to embrace a 
complex model.173   
2. The Supreme Court as Enforcer 
Another possible enforcement mechanism involves the U.S. 
Supreme Court: why not make a rule that no Justice will hire clerks 
from judges who do not follow a hiring plan?  This idea was prominently 
urged by the authors of the Harvard-Chicago study in support of the 
modified medical matching program,174 but perhaps it could be used for 
other types of plans as well.   
The logic is straightforward: some judges want to be feeder judges, 
and many students want to be considered for the Supreme Court.  If the 
path to the Supreme Court is not through judges who hire early, the 
market will change.  Because many applicants want to clerk for feeder 
judges, students with a realistic shot—and there are many more such 
students than there are slots—may say no if another judge makes an 
early offer.  Judges hoping to hire those sorts of clerks (i.e., those who 
are good enough to be competitive for a feeder judge but that may fall 
through the cracks) thus may also find themselves waiting.  Hence no 
unraveling.175   
 
172.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 883. 
173.  See, e.g., Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi, The Federal 
Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 YALE L.J. 207, 222 
(1994) (quoting Judge Richard Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit as saying that “anything more 
sophisticated [than a date would] likely . . . break down” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
174.  See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 32, at 846–47, 871–84. 
175.  It has been suggested that there are two kinds of judges—those who want to be 
feeders and those who do not.  See id. at 872–73.  The blame for the unraveling has been 
placed at the feet of the feeders.  Id.  I am not so sure.  Many judges who backslid from the 
Plan were not feeders, nor were they competing for clerks who could be fed.  See, e.g., Sloan, 
supra note 35 (noting that refusals to follow the plan were most open in “the 4th, 5th, 10th 
and 11th circuits”).  I have also seen sharp hiring practices from judges who have not sent, nor 
likely ever will send, clerks to the Supreme Court.  And do not forget state court judges, who 
are not wallflowers in the clerkship scramble. 
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There are problems with this idea, however—even if it would work, 
which is far from certain (after all, many students will say yes rather 
than hold out hope for a feeder judge, and some non-feeder judges may 
try to hire such applicants, thereby spawning another race).  Most 
significantly, the Supreme Court does not appear interested in this role.  
The reason for this reluctance seems obvious; the Supreme Court wants 
to hire whom it wants to hire.  Perhaps the Justices are being 
unreasonable; perhaps the pool of quality Supreme Court clerks is so 
deep that limiting applicants will not matter.176  But the fact remains that 
the Justices have not embraced the idea of being enforcement 
mechanisms, even though nothing is stopping a Justice from unilaterally 
doing so.  The Supreme Court appears to believe that the problem is not 
serious enough to merit its involvement.   
Nor does the Supreme Court want to be in the business of policing 
informal agreements.  With a medical matching model, some sort of 
randomization can be thrown in the mix, thus preventing informal 
agreements and wink-and-nod coffees,177 meaning that the Supreme 
Court would not have to decide whether a lower judge who purports to 
follow a hiring plan actually does so.  But, as explained above, the costs 
of a medical matching plan are high, meaning that anti-evasion device 
might not be available.  The upshot would be that the Justices 
themselves would be forced to determine whether a judge who says he 
or she followed the plan really did.  No wonder the Supreme Court isn’t 
rushing to take on this role.178   
3. Congress as Enforcer  
One clever proposal, pushed by Aaron Zelinsky, is to get Congress 
involved to stop regulation from unraveling. 
Congress has the power of the purse.  It allocates funds for 
building courthouses, keeping the lights on, and employing staff.  
For instance, law clerks are employed under 28 U.S.C. 752 (for 
district courts) and 28 U.S.C. 712 (for circuit courts). If the 
judiciary really wants to fix the hiring plan, then judges should 
request that Congress condition salaries for law clerks upon 
 
176.  See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 32, at 876–77.   
177.  Id. at 883.   
178.  The Chicago-Harvard Study, as noted above, proposes using “randomization” in a 
modified matching system to prevent this problem.  This would spare the Supreme Court the 
unpleasant chore, but with heavy costs of its own.  See Avery et al., supra note 32, at 884. 
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them being hired in compliance with the judicial hiring plan.  In 
other words, if you don’t play by the rules, you don’t have law 
clerks.179 
This proposal has much going for it.  It understands the reality 
driving the Plan’s collapse.  Courts need a powerful force outside of the 
system to “tie them to the mast.”180  And Congress is a very powerful 
force. 
Nonetheless, this too is a very costly proposal.  The problems again 
come in at least two flavors.  First, is this really the best use of Congress’ 
time?  Congress has a lot of important issues on its plate; it is hard to see 
why fixing this particular problem, limited to just the legal sector, is 
something that Congress ought to worry about.  The supposed benefits 
of a hiring plan do not seem weighty enough to merit congressional 
involvement.   
Second, it is not at all clear that congressional involvement would 
even solve the problem.  The underlying dynamic driving early hiring 
would still exist.  Judges would formally abide by the Plan, but the 
temptation to skirt the spirit of the law would not go away—again, think 
of coffees.  Such casual meetings have been in formal compliance with 
the Plan, but everyone knew that a coffee could turn into an interview 
with a wink.  The same sort of pattern could emerge again.  A workable 
enforcement mechanism must be more than just a formal rule; it 
requires active monitoring of very subtle behavior.  Congress is too busy 
for that sort of ongoing responsibility.181 
B. The Search for a Quiet Life Will Not Justify Reform 
Given the foregoing, it seems plain that a clerkship hiring plan is not 
cost-justified, at least given the benefits identified to date.  This does not 
 
179.  Aaron Zelinsky, Fixing the Judicial Clerkship Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 
2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aaron-zelinsky/fixing-the-clerkship-cris_b_258
3485.html, archived at http://perma.cc/CMH6-P4FB. 
180.  Id. 
181.  See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 1, at 26.  In a similar vein, Richard Epstein argues that 
the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts could create a list of judges who follow the 
Plan and make students decide ex ante whether to apply to judges on that list; if they decided 
to do so, they could not accept a clerkship from a judge not on the list.  See, e.g., Epstein, 
supra note 152, at 46–47.  This proposal is clever but also complex.  Nor would it necessarily 
work.  Without a method like randomization to prevent them, there would still be informal 
agreements.   
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mean that a plan would not be beneficial.182  It does mean that a plan, 
assuming it is beneficial, is not so beneficial that it justifies the costs of 
an enforcement mechanism that could actually work.  In this world of 
scarcity, not everything that is good is good enough.  Accordingly, the 
benefits of a “quiet life” are inadequate.  Many judges may prefer an 
orderly hiring process.  Such an orderly process may be more efficient, 
but the costs of obtaining and keeping order are too high. 
As George Priest has explained, the unregulated market has 
problems, but it is not the end of the world.183  Judges are pretty good at 
spotting talent, and by the time a student has finished the 1L year, there 
is a lot of data available to help in the selection process.184  In any event, 
a hiring plan might very well make exploding offers worse, unless a 
medical match model were adopted, and that would carry heavy costs of 
its own. 
C. The Need for a New Justification for a Hiring Plan 
Because the costs of a working enforcement mechanism are so steep, 
the benefits identified to date do not appear to justify regulation.  But 
might there be as-of-yet-unidentified benefits that could justify 
regulation?  Looking at the fruits of the unregulated market, this 
portion of the Article identifies three such potential benefits: increased 
diversity, greater cultivation of local talent, and better judicial outcomes.  
Obviously, these are just thought experiments.  Nonetheless, unless such 
new benefits or others like them can be empirically demonstrated, it is 
hard to see another plan getting off the ground. 
1. Law School Asymmetries 
The most compelling of these potential new arguments is the impact 
that an unregulated market might have on whom becomes clerks.  For 
instance, some research suggests—although the data is mixed, and at 
least one recent article suggests that things may be improving—that 
women, at some schools, on average do less well during the 1L year, but 
 
182.  To be sure, there is a compelling argument that a hiring plan is not a good thing—
not just that it is not cost-justified.  Indeed, if the actions of the federal bench were copied by 
private litigants, they might violate the Sherman Act.  See Pletcher & Ghesquiere, supra note 
73, at 190–91.  More likely, the benefits are mixed.  A plan hurts some and helps others.   
183.  See Priest, supra note 7, at 127–28. 
184.  Id. at 163–76. 
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the divergence dissipates in subsequent years.185  The first-year 
curriculum may be working poorly at many institutions, with asymmetric 
results.  If so, making hiring more dependent on 1L grades might have a 
negative impact on the composition of the hiring pool, at least at the 
margins.  Such asymmetries would be an obvious problem, not just for 
clerkship hiring, but for the legal academy in general.  If this data is 
confirmed then the legal profession itself has a serious problem. 
2. Fostering Local Talent 
The unregulated market should benefit higher-ranked schools.  As 
explained above, the earlier hiring occurs, the more important an 
applicant’s brand becomes.186  Might this be a problem?  If those who 
are getting clerkships increasingly hail from the very top law schools, it 
is possible that local legal communities may suffer as clerks come and 
then leave, never to return.  Local schools will not produce as many 
clerks, and clerks tend to be the stock from which local leaders of the 
bar emerge.   
An example is Utah’s newest federal appellate judge, Carolyn 
McHugh.  Judge McHugh graduated from law school in Utah, clerked in 
Utah, practiced in Utah, became a state judge in Utah, and then joined 
the Tenth Circuit.187  By any measure, she is a leader of the bar.  The 
danger is that someone like Judge McHugh would not as readily emerge 
in a world where students from the top law schools obtain even more 
clerkships and then leave for larger cities to practice.  To be sure, the 
danger should not be overstated; many prominent lawyers and judges do 
not clerk; students who attend top schools can move to more distant 
 
185.  Compare, e.g., Allison L. Bowers, Women at the University of Texas School of Law: 
A Call for Action, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 117, 134–36 (2000) (offering data suggesting that 
women do worse on average than men as 1Ls), with Shannan N. Ball, Note, Separate But 
Equal Is Unequal: The Argument Against an All-Women’s Law School, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 171, 181–82 (2001) (“Less than one percent of the variance in first year 
grades can be explained by gender.  One-half of women earned first year grade point 
averages above the class mean at their school. . . .  [W]omen are holding their own and, in 
many instances, outperforming their male counterparts.” (footnotes omitted)), and Lauren A. 
Graber, Are We There Yet? Progress Toward Gender-Neutral Legal Education, 33 B.C. J.L. & 
SOC. JUST. 45, 54 (2013) (noting studies showing grade differences but also stating that “it is 
clear that there is no meaningful difference between men and women in their average GPA 
after the first year of law school at BC Law”). 
186.  See Stras, supra note 128, at 154 tbl.1. 
187.  See Judge Carolyn B. McHugh, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, 
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/judges/judge-carolyn-b-mchugh (last visited Nov. 2, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/9QZW-MABC. 
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markets or stay where they clerk; and judges will still hire some clerks 
from schools other than the highest ranked.  But it is possible that 
reducing the number of clerkship slots available to other schools may 
have at least some ill effects on local markets. 
3. Justice 
Finally, is it possible that the unregulated market creates worse 
judicial outcomes?  As explained above, those who get clerkships, 
especially in an unregulated market, tend to be those with great 1L 
grades at the top law schools.188  Is there something about that group—
which perhaps contains a lot of “Type A” personalities—that may 
produce bad outcomes for litigants?  And is this something that judges 
aren’t catching?  A few years ago, an amusing article suggested that 
hiring Yale students as clerks is a recipe for reversal.189  Here, to justify a 
plan, it would take something like this but less tongue-in-cheek.  
Needless to say, this prospect seems far-fetched, especially if the judge is 
doing his or her job properly. 
D. Less Costly Alternatives 
Even if these three potential benefits could be shown, it would not 
necessarily follow that a new plan is justified.  The costs of a working 
enforcement mechanism would still be substantial.  This means that if 
the benefits could be achieved at lower cost, regulation might not be the 
right call.  Here, there may be just such alternatives: the rise of alumni 
hiring and greater transparency.  These trends, likewise, should make 
the unregulated market more acceptable even for those who seek 
regulation for reasons traditionally given (i.e., efficiency and decorum). 
1. More Graduate Hiring 
The last decade has seen a marked increase in applicants who have 
 
188.  See supra Part IV.B–C. 
189.  See Royce De Rohan Barondes, Want Your Opinions Reversed? Hire a Yale Clerk 
(and Don’t Require the Bar) (Univ. of Missouri–Columbia Sch. of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-8), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1116343, archived at http://perma.cc/D2HH-5M6R.  But see John Donohue, 
Why I’d Stick with Yale Clerks—Some Econometric Ruminations, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 22, 
2008), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/04/why-id-stick-with-yale-clerks-some.html (last 
updated Sept. 28, 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/9WNW-JQZB (casting some doubt on the 
study). 
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graduated at the time of application.190  As set forth above, some of this 
was driven by the Plan’s graduate loophole, which exempted such hiring 
from regulation.191  Some also likely resulted from the economic 
downturn which hit the legal market hard, including at big law firms.192  
There may be other reasons for it as well.  The upshot, however, is that 
it no longer is considered unusual to hire (or be) a clerk with some 
practice experience.  Many judges actually prefer such clerks.193   
This trend towards hiring “late” has the potential to mitigate, at least 
somewhat, the hiring “early” problem.  For instance, the inefficiency 
associated with hiring a law student early in his or her academic career 
does not exist when the applicant has already graduated.  The judge can 
look at not only two years of grades but three.  Those who wish the Plan 
had succeeded on grounds of efficiency should welcome this 
development: if the problem is insufficient information, three years are 
better than two.  Likewise, graduate hiring need not be as rushed, thus 
reducing the incentive for exploding offers and the like.  A graduate too 
may have more leverage in negotiating with a judge because she often 
already has a job, and so may be more willing to turn down an exploding 
offer.  Both of the main concerns about unregulated hiring, in other 
words, are mitigated. 
These are not the only potential benefits.  Graduate hiring can also 
mitigate the potential new problems sketched out above.  For instance, 
if it is true that women on average are disproportionately impacted by a 
focus on 1L grades, then graduate hiring could be especially beneficial 
for them.  Judges can look at an entire transcript to make a hiring 
decision.  Of course, graduate hiring is no silver bullet.  A colleague 
notes that it may be relatively more difficult for a woman to move to a 
far-off city to clerk after having already started at a law firm.  For 
example, a female associate anticipating the need for parental leave 
prior to making partner might feel less free to take a year to clerk, 
especially in a market away from her firm.  That undoubtedly is true.  
But if graduate hiring is on the rise, it stands to reason, all else being 
 
190.  See Lat, supra note 84. 
191.  See supra Part III.D. 
192.  See, e.g., Sherry Karabin, Choosing the Path to Judicial Clerkship, CHI. 
LAW. (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2011/08/clerkstory-
08-2011.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/D3G6-MX24 (“The impact of the economic 
downturn is being felt in all job sectors, including the courts.  The poor economy is leading to 
an overabundance of applicants for clerkships, even more so than in the past.”). 
193.  See Collins, supra note 20. 
 224 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:181 
equal, that it is likely that more women should be hired than if the all 
clerkship hiring occurred in a set, orderly manner in the fall of the 3L 
year.  The same sort of analysis applies to the brain drain and Type A 
problems.  If judges hold off hiring, they can hire local talent with 
greater confidence.  The advantage that Type A students have should 
also be reduced.  Needless to say, the precise strength of this mitigation 
is an empirical question beyond the scope of this Article.   
Some judges, of course, do not want to wait until after graduation.194  
This is understandable; some judges worry about clerks picking up bad 
habits in practice.195  And all else being equal, many students would 
prefer to nail down a clerkship while still in school, if only to minimize 
the logistical difficulty of moving around after having already started a 
job.  (Law firms, of course, also would prefer it when young associates 
finish clerking before starting at the firm.)  Nonetheless, this trend 
towards graduate hiring, even if not universally adopted, may be able to 
achieve many of the same benefits as regulation in a less costly way. 
2. Increased Transparency 
Another trend that may mitigate some problems associated with an 
unregulated market is the emergence of greater transparency.  For 
decades, some have argued that providing more information to 
applicants is preferable to regulating when hiring can occur.196  But 
finding information about judges and how they hire remains difficult.  
Now, however, well into the Internet age, applicants are finally 
beginning to obtain access to real information.  This access to 
information is also no silver bullet (for instance, it does little if anything 
to address the issue of clerks being hired too early).  But it can make an 
unregulated clerkship market more palatable.    
The benefit of increased transparency is that applicants will have a 
better sense beforehand whether they want to clerk for a particular 
judge.  Applicants can learn about those judges who engage in untoward 
conduct and avoid them.  Some applicants will apply anyway, even with 
more information, and some judges will not change how they behave, 
even if more people know about it.  But at least some applicants will 
apply to judges whom they like more, and at least some judges will 
become more likable.  The consequence is that the match between 
 
194.  See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 35. 
195.  See id. 
196.  See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 10, at 1728.  
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clerks and judges should improve and the amount of bad behavior 
should decrease.   
Efforts to collect and publicize information about the hiring process 
should be encouraged, especially now when it could be done more 
easily.  Alas, many of the online efforts to increase transparency have 
stalled; the Law Clerk Addict website (which hosted anonymous tips 
about the hiring process), for instance, appears to have fallen silent.  
This is unfortunate, but unsurprising.  Someone has to keep the system 
running, but it is hard to stay interested in clerking once you have a 
clerkship. 
What we need, therefore, is a third party that can collect and 
evaluate information, and that will not go away.  Although operating in 
a different context, the Better Business Bureau (BBB) is a good model.  
It receives information, evaluates it, seeks clarification, and then 
publicizes.197  Because the BBB has its own reputation to worry about, it 
does its best to present accurate information to the public.  This process 
is not perfect, but it often works well.  Why can’t there also be such an 
organization in the clerkship market?  This seems like a great project for 
an entrepreneur—some stable third-party with a reputation to protect. 
VI. CONCLUSION. 
Much has been written about the clerkship market.  The Plan’s 
collapse was predicted long before it occurred because the underlying 
market dynamic is neither new nor especially complicated.  Antitrust 
scholars have taught for decades that it is difficult to use collective 
action to move away from a market equilibrium.  This is especially true 
in a market like the one that characterizes the federal judiciary.  This is 
not a new insight, but it is one that bears repeating until it is understood.  
Collusion, no matter the motive, is a hard thing to sustain. 
With this reality in mind, what will law clerk hiring look like in the 
future?  There is good reason to think that it will look a lot like it does 
today.  The costs of an enforcement mechanism that could hold 
collective action together do not appear to justify the benefits, at least 
given the cost and benefits identified to date.  There also is reason to 
think that other potential regulatory benefits can be achieved through 
less costly means, especially if judges continue to hire applicants who 
 
197.  For information about the BBB, see COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, 
http://www.bbb.org/council/about/, archived at http://perma.cc/K6PZ-5FBR (last visited Nov. 
2, 2014). 
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have already graduated and more information about judges becomes 
available online.  It is not “fatalism”198 to say that sometimes the game 




198.  Avery et al., supra note 32, at 885. 
